Built so we can’t read your vault
Here is exactly how, and where it stops.
TriPass is built and in testing. It is not on the App Store yet. Everything on this page describes the current pre-release build.
A login, a card, a 2FA code.
AES-256-GCM, with a random 256-bit key kept in the iOS Keychain.
If you back up, our server receives data it has no key for.
PBKDF2-SHA256. 600,000 rounds for new accounts’ backup key.
Sign-in uses a separate one-way value, not the key to your vault.
Only 5 characters of a SHA-1 hash leave the phone.
Your Recovery Kit is the only way back in. We can’t reset what we can’t read.
Face ID or passcode, plus screenshot and screen-recording protection.
No account? Nothing ever leaves your phone.
Older accounts use 210,000 PBKDF2 rounds, as do the on-device key wrap and the sign-in credential. Where data is held
Only if you create an account.
| What | Can we read it? |
|---|---|
| Your email address | Yes |
| Salt, iteration count, verifier | Yes, but they open nothing |
| Sign-in credential (derived, not your password) | Firebase stores it |
| Backup key wrapped under your Recovery Kit | No |
| Your encrypted vault (backup) | No |
| Your plan (Free or Premium) | Yes |
| Which iPhone is signed in (a random ID) | Yes |
What actually happens, from the moment you create an account. Each step names the algorithm and setting, so you can check it.
On your iPhone (or in your browser), your master password is stretched with PBKDF2-SHA256 and a random salt into your vault key. Separately, it is turned into a sign-in credential by a different derivation. Firebase Authentication only ever sees that credential, so the password that protects your vault is never sent.
Your logins, cards and 2FA codes are each encrypted as a whole with AES-256-GCM before upload. GCM also detects tampering: a changed byte makes decryption fail instead of returning wrong data. Devices merge changes item by item after decrypting on the device, so the server never needs to read anything.
When you create an account, your device makes a random 25-character code (about 125 bits), wraps your vault key under it, and shows it to you once. We keep the wrapped key and a check value, never the code. Recovering means proving you have the code, unwrapping the key on your device, and choosing a new master password; everything is re-encrypted and you get a new code.
The key for your on-device vault lives in the iOS Keychain. The app opens with Face ID or your passcode and asks again before showing a secret. It warns you if the phone looks jailbroken, because then iOS protections can’t be relied on.
At tripass.com.au, your key is made in the page and held only in its memory; nothing about your vault is saved in the browser, and it locks after 10 minutes without activity. The page may only talk to Google’s sign-in, the database and our recovery service, enforced by a strict Content Security Policy. The Chrome extension keeps the key in Chrome’s memory-only session storage, where web pages can’t reach it, and only fills a login when you choose one.
Email support@tripass.com.au with “Security” in the subject. Please give us a reasonable chance to fix an issue before publishing it; we will credit you if you would like. Our contact details are also published at tripass.com.au/.well-known/security.txt.
Anonymous events, never vault contents. On by default; off in Settings.
Stack traces, never your data. On by default; off in Settings.
Off by default. If on, the logo provider sees which sites you use.
These panels use your browser's built-in Web Crypto with the same algorithms and parameters as the app. This is not the app's code, but it does the same maths.
PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations with a random salt derives the key. AES-256-GCM encrypts the note. Nothing is sent anywhere.
Your browser hashes the password with SHA-1 and sends only the first 5 characters to Have I Been Pwned, which returns every breached hash starting with them. The match happens here. This is the method the app uses (k-anonymity).
Sending 5 characters keeps the password itself private. The request still reveals that someone checked a password with that prefix. In the app, breach checks are part of Premium.
A quick estimate from length, character variety, repeats and common words. It is a rule of thumb written for this page, not the app’s Password Health scoring and not a crack-time guarantee. Nothing is sent.
No independent audit yet, and no certifications claimed. What we do is set out in full in the Privacy Policy.