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How TriPass encryption works

Built so we can’t read your vault

Here is exactly how, and where it stops.

TriPass is built and in testing. It is not on the App Store yet. Everything on this page describes the current pre-release build.

How it works

1

You save something

A login, a card, a 2FA code.

2

It’s sealed on your iPhone

AES-256-GCM, with a random 256-bit key kept in the iOS Keychain.

3

Only ciphertext leaves

If you back up, our server receives data it has no key for.

The essentials

Keys from your master password

PBKDF2-SHA256. 600,000 rounds for new accounts’ backup key.

Your password is never sent

Sign-in uses a separate one-way value, not the key to your vault.

Private breach checks

Only 5 characters of a SHA-1 hash leave the phone.

No reset, by design

Your Recovery Kit is the only way back in. We can’t reset what we can’t read.

Locked when you’re not looking

Face ID or passcode, plus screenshot and screen-recording protection.

Account optional

No account? Nothing ever leaves your phone.

Older accounts use 210,000 PBKDF2 rounds, as do the on-device key wrap and the sign-in credential. Where data is held

What our server holds

Only if you create an account.

WhatCan we read it?
Your email addressYes
Salt, iteration count, verifierYes, but they open nothing
Sign-in credential (derived, not your password)Firebase stores it
Backup key wrapped under your Recovery KitNo
Your encrypted vault (backup)No
Your plan (Free or Premium)Yes
Which iPhone is signed in (a random ID)Yes

Step by step

What actually happens, from the moment you create an account. Each step names the algorithm and setting, so you can check it.

01 · Creating an account

Your master password becomes two different things

On your iPhone (or in your browser), your master password is stretched with PBKDF2-SHA256 and a random salt into your vault key. Separately, it is turned into a sign-in credential by a different derivation. Firebase Authentication only ever sees that credential, so the password that protects your vault is never sent.

Vault key
PBKDF2-SHA256, 600,000 rounds, random 16-byte salt
Sign-in credential
A separate one-way derivation (210,000 rounds); not your password, not your key
Stored to check you
Salt, round count and a verifier that opens nothing
02 · Saving and syncing

Sealed before it leaves the device

Your logins, cards and 2FA codes are each encrypted as a whole with AES-256-GCM before upload. GCM also detects tampering: a changed byte makes decryption fail instead of returning wrong data. Devices merge changes item by item after decrypting on the device, so the server never needs to read anything.

Cipher
AES-256-GCM, a fresh random 12-byte nonce every time
Server sees
Ciphertext, plus the time it was written
Database rules
Only your signed-in account can read or write your records
03 · Recovery Kit

A backup key only you hold

When you create an account, your device makes a random 25-character code (about 125 bits), wraps your vault key under it, and shows it to you once. We keep the wrapped key and a check value, never the code. Recovering means proving you have the code, unwrapping the key on your device, and choosing a new master password; everything is re-encrypted and you get a new code.

Code strength
About 125 bits of randomness
Guess limit
10 attempts an hour per account
We store
The wrapped key and a hash of a proof; not the code
04 · On your iPhone

Protected by the phone itself

The key for your on-device vault lives in the iOS Keychain. The app opens with Face ID or your passcode and asks again before showing a secret. It warns you if the phone looks jailbroken, because then iOS protections can’t be relied on.

Key storage
iOS Keychain, this device only
Unlock
Face ID or device passcode
Screen
Screenshots and recording blocked; app switcher hides contents
05 · Web vault and Chrome

Keys kept in memory, never saved

At tripass.com.au, your key is made in the page and held only in its memory; nothing about your vault is saved in the browser, and it locks after 10 minutes without activity. The page may only talk to Google’s sign-in, the database and our recovery service, enforced by a strict Content Security Policy. The Chrome extension keeps the key in Chrome’s memory-only session storage, where web pages can’t reach it, and only fills a login when you choose one.

Web vault
Key in page memory only; idle lock after 10 minutes
Chrome extension
Key in session storage (memory); suggestions only on the right site
Same maths
Web Crypto, the same algorithms and settings as the app
06 · Found a problem?

Tell us

Email support@tripass.com.au with “Security” in the subject. Please give us a reasonable chance to fix an issue before publishing it; we will credit you if you would like. Our contact details are also published at tripass.com.au/.well-known/security.txt.

Where it stops protecting you

A weak master passwordA stolen database lets guesses run offline. Use a long passphrase.
A compromised phoneJailbroken or infected devices are out of our reach.
Losing both keysNo master password and no Recovery Kit means no way back in.
Breach-check requestsThe 5 characters show a check happened, not which password.

Other data, in plain sight

Usage analytics

Anonymous events, never vault contents. On by default; off in Settings.

Crash reports

Stack traces, never your data. On by default; off in Settings.

Site logos

Off by default. If on, the logo provider sees which sites you use.

Don't take our word for it

Run the crypto
yourself.

These panels use your browser's built-in Web Crypto with the same algorithms and parameters as the app. This is not the app's code, but it does the same maths.

Demo 01 · runs entirely in this tab

Encrypt it like TriPass does

PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations with a random salt derives the key. AES-256-GCM encrypts the note. Nothing is sent anywhere.

Key derivationnot run yet
Salt-
Nonce-
What a server would store-
Encrypt something first.
Demo 02 · sends 5 characters

Has this password been breached?

Your browser hashes the password with SHA-1 and sends only the first 5 characters to Have I Been Pwned, which returns every breached hash starting with them. The match happens here. This is the method the app uses (k-anonymity).

SHA-1 (computed here)-
Sent to api.pwnedpasswords.com-
Result-

Sending 5 characters keeps the password itself private. The request still reveals that someone checked a password with that prefix. In the app, breach checks are part of Premium.

Demo 03 · runs entirely in this tab

Rough password strength

A quick estimate from length, character variety, repeats and common words. It is a rule of thumb written for this page, not the app’s Password Health scoring and not a crack-time guarantee. Nothing is sent.

Type to see a rough estimate
Random characters, shown to illustrate scrambling. This is not encryption; Demo 01 is.
Nothing typed here ever leaves your browser.

No independent audit yet, and no certifications claimed. What we do is set out in full in the Privacy Policy.

Free or Premium, the lock is the same.

Security isn’t a paid feature here.